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Abstract 
Through successive industrial revolutions, the geography of innovation around the globe 
has changed radically, and with it the geography of wealth creation and prosperity. Since the 
Third Industrial Revolution, high incomes are increasingly metropolitan, leading to a renewal 
of inter-regional divergence within countries. These metropolitan areas are also hotbeds of 
innovation. At the same time, global networks for the production and delivery of goods and 
services have expanded greatly in recent decades. The globalization of production is mirrored 
in the globalization of innovation. The paper argues that the emerging geography of innovation 
can be characterised as a globalized hub-to-hub system, rather than a geography of overall 
spread of innovation and illustrates these trends using patent data. Although much attention has 
been given to explaining the rise and growth of innovation clusters, there is as yet no unified 
framework for the micro-foundations of the agglomeration and dispersion of innovation. In 
addition, there appear to be strong links between growing geographical inequality of innovation 
and prosperity, particularly within countries. This is particularly relevant in the context of 
declining overall research productivity, which could be driving growing geographical 
concentration. All in all, there is a rich agenda for continuing to investigate the relationship 
between the geography of innovation, economic development and income distribution.  
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1. Introduction: The geography of innovation in the Third Industrial 
Revolution 
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Since the time of the first industrial revolution in the early 19th century, innovation has 
not only been a motor of economic growth; it has also strongly shaped unequal geographical 
patterns of development and distributions of income. The contemporary geography of the wave 
of innovation known as the Third Industrial Revolution involves a complex rescaling compared 
to the past, with innovation becoming at the same time both more global and intensely 
localized. This has led to new forms of agglomeration, with strong impacts on the distribution 
of income. In this paper, we synthesize and integrate the two literatures on the global spread of 
innovation on the one hand and the local innovation activity on the other. While the former 
emphasizes the global rate of technological progress and global income convergence, the latter 
focuses on clusters of innovation activity and the local economic development effects.  
We demonstrate that global spread of technology development is increasingly associated 
with stronger metropolitan-scale concentration. These trends can be seen as complements 
rather than substitutes for one another. If there are images that can capture this emerging 
geography it is that of a globalized hub-to-hub (or hotspot to hotspot) system, or concentrated 
dispersion. The world system of innovation links national and regional systems of innovation 
and global firms through a spiky geography of knowledge creation and a global network of 
these spikes or hubs, many of which are better connected to one another than they are to their 
national hinterlands in terms of knowledge creation and diffusion.  
The world’s wealthy countries experienced inter-regional income convergence from about 
1940 to 1980, but since then it has largely come to a halt or been reversed, and high incomes 
are now increasingly metropolitan, in both the developed and emerging economies. Skilled 
workers now flow more to metropolitan areas than in the 20th century, although selectively, 
with some older metropolitan areas never having recovered fully from deindustrialization. 
Most of the highest income metropolitan areas are also hotbeds, or agglomerated ecosystems, 
of innovation. Thus, the emerging world geography of innovation is, like the world geography 
of development, one of ‘concentrated dispersion’ (Ernst and Kim, 2002). 
 
 
2. Data 
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To document the shifting global geography of innovation, we use patent records from the 
OECD REPAT database1. The dataset includes individual records of patents filed with the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), 
as well as patents filed with the European Patent Office (EPO). These are matched to TL3 
regions by inventor and applicant. The database covers 1964 to 2018, although there are only 
few patents before 1978 and few after 2016. All figures below are cut off before 1980 and after 
2016. Detailed technology classes are provided (e.g. “G06K 19/07739”). Overall, there are 6.8 
million individual patents in the database. Applicants are from 230 countries and 5431 TL3 
regions, including some cross-border regions that are not attributed to a single country.  
The figures below are based on the inventor location and include PCT filings only. Patents 
that have multiple inventors from different regions are assigned based on the number of 
inventors in each region, e.g. if there are two inventors from two regions, each region is 
assigned 1/2 patent. If there are three inventors with two in region A and another one in region 
B, region A is assigned 2/3 of a patent, and region B is assigned 1/3 of a patent. While Hong 
Kong and China are treated as Chinese regions in the OECD classification, Hong Kong and 
Taiwan are analysed separately from Mainland China below, because they operate as 
distinctive economic territories.  
Patents can be filed in multiple technology classes. In fact, this is the case for most patents. 
Therefore, when analysing filings by class below, this is based on the number of patents that 
were filed in a particular class, but assignments are not mutually exclusive. When looking at 
shares of patents filed in different classes, the totals add up to more than 100% because of this 
overlap. Where a figure presents the number of patents by class, this is the absolute number of 
classes filed, and patents are not counted fractionally (i.e. a patent would not be counted as ½ 
if it was also filed in a second class.  
As patent classes are very detailed, we need a classification that is economically 
meaningful. The analysis below is based on eight broad technology classes. Additionally, the 
OECD has developed a taxonomy of Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) 
based on the International Patent Classification (Inaba and Squicciarini, 2017). This 
classification, known as the “J-tag”, as it was developed in collaboration with the Japanese 
Patent Office, groups ICT-related patents into 13 technology areas and 25 sub-areas. In the 
analysis below, we rely only on total ICT filings, and look at the detailed classes in the last 
section. All definitions can be found in figure A1 in the appendix.  
                                                          
1
 Available at: http://www.oecd.org/sti/intellectual-property-statistics-and-analysis.htm 
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3. The Geography of Technology Production: Dispersion and 
Concentration Forces 
 
There are many outstanding debates about the precise origins of the first industrial 
revolution in the 17th and 18th century, but there is widespread agreement that it was the 
belated result of a sharp uptick in evidence-based scientific thinking that occurred in Europe in 
the 1600s. Increasingly systematic and cumulative development of new theoretical knowledge 
allowed for systematic application, yielding a productivity revolution (Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson, 2005; Mokyr, 2005).  
These twin revolutions – scientific and industrial or technological – introduced a 
distinctive geographical development hierarchy to the world economy, beginning in the late 
18th century, known as the Great Divergence (Pomeranz, 2000). It enabled a selected set of 
regions and cities in Europe to rise to the top of the global hierarchy of incomes and 
development (Crafts and Venables, 2003). Since then, each successive major industrial 
revolution has had its own distinctive geography. The Second Industrial Revolution, which was 
broadly electro-mechanical, witnessed the entry of North America into the high-income club 
of the world, while broadening the industrialized regions of Europe. The benefits spread widely 
through the territories of innovative countries, down their urban hierarchies, generating a 
tendency to inter-regional income convergence in the middle decades of the twentieth century 
(Kemeny and Storper, 2020; Rosés and Wolf, 2019).  
More recently, a Third Industrial Revolution began around 1980, with a Fourth possibly 
here or on its way (Baldwin, 2016). The Third IR broadly involves information and 
communication technologies, life science and biological technologies, financial engineering, 
and significant breakthroughs in transport and logistics. The geography of economic 
development in this period has undergone some significant changes. There has been a spread 
of development at a global scale, starting with a set of rapidly developing Asian economies that 
are now in the high-income group, including South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. 
Subsequently, a set of large emerging economies has risen into the global middle-income core, 
with China the largest of them. This expresses a certain spreading out of global development.  
At the same time, except for China, the structural hierarchy of global per capita incomes 
by country has not converged over the past few decades, because for the most part, the high-
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income countries have succeeded in reproducing their position in the global income hierarchy 
through sustained innovation and productivity improvements. (Bourguignon, 2017; Milanovic, 
2010; Sala-i-Martin, 1997). This is because not all innovative activity is of the same quality, 
and some of the new middle-income countries and regions remain far behind the international 
technology frontier (Crescenzi, Pietrobelli, and Rabellotti, 2014; Dunning and Lundan, 2009). 
As we will see below, only South Korea and China (with Japan already firmly established in 
the 1980s) emerge as significant contributors to global innovation production.  
Despite the global spread of development, many countries witness increasing inter-
regional polarization of incomes and opportunity, manifested in the rise of superstar cities and 
left-behind regions, geographical concentration of skilled workers, and the rise in urban wage 
premiums for those workers (Giannone, 2017; Autor, 2019). This is a different geography of 
income distribution from the period prior to the 1980s, when in most developed countries, inter-
regional convergence had been occurring since the 1940s, with a smoothing of the landscape 
of wages, skills, opportunity and amenities. As such, the current situation is known as “the 
great inversion” (Ganong and Shoag, 2017; Moretti, 2012; Kemeny and Storper, 2020; Florida, 
2017; Davis and Dingel, 2019). The concentration of technology production in sub-national 
metropolitan hotspots mirrors the geography of per capita income and the increasing 
concentration of the skilled in hotspots.  
 
3.1. Dispersion process 
 
In the First and Second industrial revolutions, knowledge and hardware circulated 
extensively across national borders. The difference today is that knowledge does not just 
diffuse but is created in collaboration across space. Contemporary knowledge clusters have 
long-distance ties, which have become more organized and extensive over time, and which 
often involve the co-development of technologies across agglomerations, both within firms and 
between competing firms. New knowledge may be brought into the region through the 
establishment of extra-local linkages (e.g. Bathelt, Malmberg, and Maskell, 2004; Boschma, 
2005; Frenken, Van Oort, and Verburg, 2007). The additive nature of innovation implies that 
this new knowledge then feeds back into the innovation process.  
However, this global network of hubs is not evenly distributed enough at the present time 
to generate a world geography of international technological convergence. International 
technology gaps have remained relatively stable (Kemeny, 2011). While emerging economies 
are progressing, advanced economies have in general been able to maintain their position at 
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the top of the world technology ladder by specializing in the most technologically advanced 
products, and within product classes in high quality varieties (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 
1995; Myrdal, 1957; Perez, 2010). As we will see below, only South Korea and China have 
advanced their innovative capacity to the technology frontier in recent years.  
Among the drivers of the dispersion of innovation activity are multinational enterprises 
(MNEs). Cantwell (1995) describes the process of internationalization of R&D by MNEs 
starting from the 1960s. MNEs from the US and Western Europe, particularly France and 
Germany, increased their share of R&D activity undertaken abroad from initially low levels. 
In smaller European countries such as the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland, but also the 
UK, this share was already relatively high during the 1960s. In contrast, internationalization of 
Japanese MNEs progressed slowly during the 1960s and 70s, and it is still comparatively low. 
From the mid-20th century until the Great Recession beginning in 2009, technological activity 
was steadily internationalizing, with new countries emerging in the international system of 
innovation (Athreye and Cantwell, 2007).  
The global spread of innovation is not only due to the advent of global networks and the 
flows of knowledge through them, and MNEs based in developed economies, but also to 
national innovation strategies and policies that succeeded in building world-class innovation 
systems in a set of formerly middle-income economies. These include South Korea, Taiwan, 
Singapore, and Israel, and – more recently – China and India (Amsden, 2001; Wade, 1990). 
The concept of the National Innovation System (Freeman, 1987; Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993) 
refers to the interlocking set of institutions, investments, strategies and practices that stimulate 
innovation and drive the innovation specializations of countries down particular pathways. 
Originally applied to the advanced countries, it was subsequently extended to the developing 
world (e.g. Lundvall, Joseph, Chaminade, and Vang, 2009). The spread of innovation globally 
seems in part to be due to the spread, however limited, of successful national innovation 
systems.  
In any innovation system, the public sector, academic and other research institutions are 
key actors alongside private-sector firms, investors and many other kinds of dealmakers and 
intermediaries. Public R&D spending is declining as a share of total R&D in advanced 
countries (Filippetti and Archibugi, 2011; Mazzucato, 2015), but this is not the case in 
emerging economies. In many of the most successful emerging economies today and the now 
developed former middle-income economies, industrial policy with a strong innovation 
component was in evidence during their economic ascent and beyond (Archibugi and Filippetti, 
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But all of these policies may have concentrating internal effects, as it may be more efficient 
to target scarce resources than spreading them evenly but thinly. For example, evidence from 
the UK suggests that public R&D funding disproportionally benefits economically stronger 
regions (Forth and Jones, 2020). In today’s agglomerated innovation environment, moreover, 
certain public sector institutions (especially universities) are strongly reinforced by market 
forces that make some more attractive to students, faculty and funders than others, reducing 
the efficiency of public sector policies for spreading innovation around the different regions.  
 
3.2. Concentration process 
 
While innovative activity is spreading globally, there are strong agglomeration forces at 
play that result in clustering of innovators and innovative firms and institutions. Researchers 
are more productive in larger agglomerations (Moretti, 2019). Innovation generated in larger, 
more diverse agglomerations tends to be more unconventional, in the sense that those patents 
cite previous patents from an unusual range of technology classes (Berkes and Gaetani, 2020; 
Nathan and Lee, 2013). Agglomeration effects not only spur innovation but increase 
productivity in general. One estimate puts the effect of doubling employment density on 
productivity at 5% in Europe (Ciccone, 2002). The effects of R&D spending are highly 
localized: while doubling R&D spending in a region is estimated to increase innovation outputs 
in that region by 80-90%, spillover effects in a radius of 300km are estimated at only 2-3% 
(Bottazzi and Peri, 2003).  
The spatial concentration of innovation activities is mirrored in the concentration of 
university graduates and science, engineering and technology workers (Davis and Dingel, 
2014). In the US, this coincides with a concentration of skilled employment towards some 
larger cities from small and medium-sized counties, particularly for skilled service jobs 
(Carlino and Chatterjee, 2002; Desmet and Fafchamps, 2006). This picture is complemented 
by evidence of both international and inter-regional migration of graduates in general and 
inventors in particular towards innovative regions, reinforcing their lead over lacking regions 
(Breschi, Lissoni and Tarasconi, 2014; Faggian and McCann, 2009; Iammarino and Marinelli, 
2015; United States Congress, 2019).  
Localised networks are among the centripetal forces, attracting agents to dense labour 
markets (Capello and Faggian, 2005; Maskell and Malmberg, 1999). The strength, type, quality 
and breadth of ties within the network, can be described as different levels of “embeddedness”, 
facilitating diffusion of knowledge and enhancing collective learning in clusters (Giuliani, 
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2007, p. 140). These effects are of direct benefit to the skilled, who can reap learning and 
experience premiums by being in the geographical hotspots of where networks are deep and 
their key nodes are centralized (De la Roca and Puga, 2017). While the city-size premium used 
to benefit workers across a wide spectrum of occupations, evidence suggests that more recently, 
only skilled workers benefit, contributing to the rapid growth in geographical differences in the 
wages of the skilled, and widening wage gaps within cities (Autor, 2019).  
Labor supply clearly influences the development trajectory of innovative agglomerations. 
The characteristics of the local population that matter for the local innovation system, such as 
skill endowments, employment rate and demographics, can be summarized as “social filters.” 
They have been found to impact regional innovativeness, both in the US and in the EU 
(Crescenzi, Rodríguez-Pose, and Storper, 2007). Furthermore, they also drive investment 
location decisions, showing that businesses are aware of the importance of these local assets 
(Crescenzi, Pietrobelli, and Rabellotti., 2014 and 2016b).  
Geographical proximity is not the only source of knowledge spillovers and recombination 
today. This notion has been operationalized by means of other metaphorical forms of 
“proximity” between the agents involved in innovation (Boschma, 2005). Organizational 
proximity refers to the organized interactions and possibly lower transaction costs within firms 
(especially MNEs), research organizations or organized networks, or states. Institutional 
proximity refers to actors that operate within unified institutional rules or routines (sometimes 
including intra-organizational). This would facilitate interaction within national systems or 
aligned international rules, and through professional networks facilitated by institutional 
similarity. Finally, drawing on the classical sociological concept of “ties” between persons, 
innovators with social proximity – ranging from inter-personal to being part of the same culture 
or group – are likely to have lower interaction costs, easier verification and higher trust – than 
those that are socially distant (Granovetter, 1973; Lissoni, 2001; Uzzi, 1997).  
Yet, organizational, institutional and social proximity have not been shown to be 
substitutes for geographical proximity. On the whole, social and other proximities probably 
work in conjunction with geographical proximity (Crescenzi, Filippetti, and Iammarino, 2017; 
Crescenzi, Nathan and Rodríguez-Pose, 2016a; D’Este, Iammarino, and Guy, 2013). 
Moreover, geographical co-location may be both a cause and an outcome of these other 
proximities. If various kinds of proximity are needed for successful innovation, the problem is 
that we know little about the causal sequences by which such different proximities come about. 
In effect, we know little about whether innovation can be started with a given kind of proximity, 
or whether some proximities are outcomes of other features of a successful innovation system.  
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We noted earlier that MNEs are key actors facilitating the growth of the global innovation 
system. But they also reinforce the key nodes in that system, innovative agglomerations. MNEs 
tap into regional strengths and might improve them further, thus reinforcing the process of local 
technological concentration. On the other hand, MNEs may spur the diversification of the 
regional profile towards areas of interrelated technological competence. For example, the rise 
of ICT in the 1980s stimulated increases of R&D in some closely related previously existing 
electricity and electronics technologies. Such interrelatedness may therefore have pushed the 
broadening of technological specialization in certain metropolitan cores that were specialized 
in 2nd IR electrical technologies, toward the newer 3rd IR ICT technologies (Alcácer, 
Cantwell, and Piscitello, 2016; Cantwell and Iammarino, 2001). 
These patterns are evident in the superstar cities that are also often key nodes in worldwide 
production, technology and trade networks (e.g. Iammarino, Rodríguez-Pose and Storper, 
2018; Sassen, 2001 and 2009; Taylor, 2004). They are the primary homes and hosts of major 
knowledge-based MNEs and the true beneficiaries of globalization, being centers of political 
influence, corporate decision-making and control, knowledge generation and exchange, skills 
and jobs (e.g. McCann and Acs, 2011; Yeung, 2009; Feldman, Guy and Iammarino, 2019). But 
their prosperity is accompanied by high levels of income inequality, spatial segregation within 
them, and a growing split with the so-called “Left Behind Regions” (Rodríguez-Pose, 2018), 
leading some to speak of a new “urban crisis” (Florida, 2017).  
 
 
4. The Spread Process: Global Innovation Networks 
 
There is considerable interaction between the geography of trade and the emerging 
geography of global innovation, with some important differences in resulting patterns. 
Compared to previous waves of globalization, the current wave, since 1972, has a much higher 
proportion of intra-industry trade of both components and final goods. Prior to 2000, most of 
such intra-industry trade took place among the Global North countries, but since then it has 
increasingly concerned the relationships between emerging market economies and the rest of 
the world. Moreover, global production networks often involve multiple or circular trade, with 
exports wrapped into subsequent outputs and ending up as imports, blurring the lines between 
foreign and domestic production. This is true of knowledge as well, where innovation involves 
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the circulation and recombination of ideas across multiple regional and national contexts in 
complex global innovation networks (GINs).  
The integration of East Asian economies into the global innovation landscape is evident in 
figure 1, starting with Japan in the 1990s. In the early 2000s, patenting activity in South Korea 
takes off, albeit on a flatter trajectory than Japan’s. From the mid-2000s, China enters the 
picture, with exponential patenting growth from around 2008. Despite the rapid growth in 
patenting in these countries, North America and Europe continue to hold their dominant 
position. Note that Germany is plotted on a separate line to the rest of Europe, bringing the 
total European contribution to a similar level as North America. It remains to be seen whether 
the East Asian economies will overtake North America and Europe, or whether we are entering 
a new era of more globally balanced innovation.  
What is also clear from figure 1 is that patenting activity in other emerging economies is 
still lacking far behind the incumbents and new East Asian stars. The figure includes Brazil, 
India and Russia, but their total annual patenting remains very low. For other countries in the 
rest of the world, slow but steady growth can be noticed.  
 
[Figure 1 around here] 
 
The rise of the East Asian economies’ innovation capacity has to be seen in the broader 
context of their development trajectory. In developing this capacity at speed and on a 
significant scale, government action played a key role. However, the public sector influences 
innovation through much more than deliberate industrial policies (e.g. David, Hall, and Toole, 
2000). An obvious form of public sector policy with a distinctive geography is the role of 
universities and public research laboratories and organizations (Mansfield and Lee, 1996; 
Salter and Martin, 2001). In most of the former middle-income economies that are now high-
income and highly innovative regions of the world (besides Japan and South Korea, also 
Singapore, Israel, Taiwan, with China on a promising trajectory), concerted and successful 
effort was made to build top-ranked research universities (Hershberg, Nabeshima, and Yusuf, 
2007). In China today, it seems likely that the appearance of top world innovation clusters is 
related to the investments in top world research universities. Public sector laboratories (such as 
the CNRS (National Science Research) labs in France or the national laboratories in the USA) 
also figure highly in the national innovation profile. These strategies follow examples of 
developed countries. The United States from 1875 to 1975 is exemplary: the federal Land Grant 
Colleges system extended research universities to many parts of the United States, and federal 
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funding for universities reinforced the proliferation of private universities in that period as well. 
The California system is perhaps the most successful of all, with the public University of 
California system having 3 of the world’s top twenty universities, and 6 of the top 50. The 
investments required to carry out such strategies are large and must be long-term and 
appropriately institutionally organized (Nervis, 1962).  
Growing investments in education and research universities have a secondary effect on the 
global dispersion of innovation, by creating cohorts of highly trained scientists and engineers 
that are increasingly globally mobile. The international and inter-regional mobility of skilled 
innovators is a key feature of the contemporary innovation environment. This mobility may 
positively stimulate the international diffusion of innovation by becoming a key glue in GINs 
(Miguélez and Moreno, 2013). Saxenian (1999) explores the interaction of people and 
investment networks through the mobility of skilled Chinese and Indian entrepreneurs in 
Silicon Valley. As these skilled entrepreneurs move around, they engage in sharing knowledge, 
leading to a ‘brain circulation’.  
International dispersion of innovation follows patterns of the global division of labor, as 
innovation activities pushing the technology frontier take place in (relatively few) established 
centers of excellence, whereas more routinized research activities take place in emerging 
economies. In this respect, the growing dominance of East Asian economies in physics and 
electricity patenting classes, as shown in figure 2, can also be seen as a sign of the growing 
sophistication of their economies. In contrast, some Central and Eastern European countries, 
such as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, have experienced growth in their innovation 
activity and inflows of FDI. However, this tends to be in older industries, such as mechanical 
engineering and mining/energy (Krammer, 2009).  
 
[Figure 2 around here] 
 
The relation between the global division of labor and innovation activity becomes clearer 
when considering the activities of Multinational Enterprises (MNEs). It has long been debated 
whether multinational enterprises are territorialized and highly attached to their home country, 
or whether somehow they were dis-embedded, simple articulators of a global chain of activities 
with little attachment to home territory (Vernon, 1979). Reconciling the two positions, they 
can be considered key agents of dispersion, but they also do so from a position of high levels 
of embeddedness in their national economies, and usually in specific regions within their 
countries of origin. They do this because they use GINs as ways to acquire knowledge and 
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deploy knowledge, strengthening their performance at home and abroad (Catellani and Zanfei, 
2006 and 2007). However, while the internationalization of R&D by MNEs is growing rapidly, 
most businesses still exhibit substantial home bias in their research activities. Economies of 
scale and scope, coordination costs and embeddedness within the home country/region 
innovation system all result in more spatially concentrated corporate R&D activities than might 
be expected from otherwise highly internationalized activities of businesses (Belderbos, Leten 
and Suzuki, 2013).  
The other side of this coin is that  key knowledge-generating territories around the world 
are usually both home to key firms that construct and participate in GINs, but they are also 
very likely to be hosts for foreign firms wishing to get access to their knowledge-generating 
ecosystems, talent pool, and researchers. Agglomeration forces have attracted MNE activities 
– especially high-value added ones – to particular locations in both advanced and emerging 
economies, thus making the geographical destination of MNEs progressively less dependent 
on purely cost-based and relative endowment considerations (Iammarino and McCann, 2018). 
Mostly intangible location advantages are highly concentrated within specific regions, cities 
and local systems, and contribute to enhancing firm-specific ownership-advantages, which in 
turn strengthen those of the many locations where the MNE is present. This has offered new 
opportunities for regions and cities to link up to different parts or functions of GVCs in ways 
that promote economic upgrading and innovation (Crescenzi, Harman, and Arnold, 2019). The 
off-shoring of R&D activities – as part of the expansion and re-configuration of GVCs and 
GPNs - has created new inter-connected architectures of innovation and research (Massini and 
Miozzo, 2012; De Backer, 2011; Schmitz and Strambach, 2009) as well as new co-location 
patterns with production activities. The simple nation-based host-home dichotomy largely 
applied in the academic literature to the MNE question therefore has become less useful in 
relation to knowledge flows. Core regions are those subnational places where host and home 
overlap to a great extent, and the direction of such flows is eminently bi- or multi-lateral 
(Crescenzi and Iammarino, 2017; Iammarino and McCann, 2018). 
At the same time participation in global networks is a challenge for weaker regions. 
Uneven participation in GINs and GVCs generates new core-periphery patterns in the global 
geography of innovation. However, comparable evidence on knowledge and innovation drivers 
of regional integration in GVCs at the subnational level remains thin (Crescenzi et al., 2014; 
Crescenzi et al., 2019).  
There is a paradox in this global division of innovation activity. While dispersion would 
allow for deeper specialization, with MNEs being able to tap into localized specialties through 
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global networks, different technologies are less nationally concentrated than they used to be. 
Figure 3 shows the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of patent filings by technology class across 
countries. A higher index indicates that patenting in this class is more concentrated within a 
small number of countries, while a lower index suggests that patenting is more evenly spread 
across countries. In almost all technology classes, concentration has fallen markedly over the 
last 1.5 decades. This mirrors developments in international trade discussed earlier: growing 
intra-industry trade suggests a lower degree of specialization within countries. To come back 
to the patenting picture in figure 3, it suggests that more countries are active in a wide range of 
technologies, perhaps all with their own niches that are connected through GINs.  
 
[Figure 3 around here] 
 
The globalization of innovation is the interface “between the two fundamental phenomena 
of modern economies: the increased international integration of economic activities and the 
rising importance of knowledge in economic processes” (Archibugi and Iammarino 2002, p. 
100). Among the main motivations to internationalize R&D activities are shorter times to bring 
products to market (e.g. von Zedtwitz and Gassmann, 2002), access to talent as well as cost 
advantages (e.g. Lewin, Massini, and Peeters, 2009), and tapping into localized areas of 
technological excellence (e.g. Cantwell and Janne, 1999).  
Emerging market MNEs are increasingly using outward FDI to expand their market reach 
and to capture strategic assets such as technologies, skills, commercial knowledge and brands 
(Crescenzi & Iammarino, 2017). Local technological competences are only important for 
attracting emerging market FDI if the prospective subsidiary will engage in technology 
intensive activities (Crescenzi et al., 2016b). Chinese OFDI is growing rapidly, notably since 
the financial crisis, which Chinese businesses survived relatively unharmed (Davies, 2010; 
Wei, 2013).  
 
 
5. The Concentration Process: Innovation in Urban Hotspots and 
Specialized Niche Clusters 
 
While innovation activity is growing outside the traditional centers of the US and western 
Europe, it needs to be stressed that this dispersion is uneven. It is principally confined to some 
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urban areas in some countries. Innovation, like any leading edge of the economy, has always 
had geographical concentrations or hotspots: Manchester was to the First Industrial Revolution 
what San Francisco is to the Third. Yet, there was a period from about 1940 to 1980, where 
such geographical concentrations diminished, and innovation spread within the advanced 
economies. There are some differences between the US and Europe. Europe has a smaller urban 
size productivity premium than the USA in general, and a bigger role for medium-sized 
metropolitan areas. City-regions in Europe are not as specialized as their American 
counterparts in the areas in which they innovate (Crescenzi et al., 2007).  
In the global context, figure 4 shows the massive shifts in the global geography of 
innovation between the 1990s and 2010s. Between 1990 and 1994, California was by far the 
most important innovation hotspot in the world. However, beyond that, there were many North 
American and European regions – as well as Southern Kanto in Japan – with relatively similar 
levels of patenting, at around a third of the size of California. Many traditional manufacturing 
regions, such as North Rhine Westphalia, Pennsylvania and Ohio were among the top 
innovating regions.  
This changed dramatically within twenty years. The lower panel of figure 4 shows the top 
patenting regions in 2012 to 2016. California was overtaken by Southern Kanto and 
Guangdong. The top three are followed with a small gap by the capital region of Korea, Kansai, 
Toukai (both Japan) and Beijing. Only then appear the next North American and European 
regions, including Bavaria, Baden-Wurttemberg, Texas and Massachusetts. This illustrates 
both the global spread of innovation to newly emerging East Asian hotspots, as well as the 
relative decline of innovation hotspots that were also manufacturing clusters.  
 
[Figure 4 around here] 
 
5.1. From sectoral to functional specialization 
 
In the First and Second Industrial Revolutions, innovation activity was often strongly co-
agglomerated with leading production activities, resulting in large, sectorally specialized 
industrial cities that also co-located R&D and product development. Since 1980, however, 
these patterns of co-agglomeration have changed. Co-location patterns have become more 
determined by shared skill requirements (labor market pooling across different but related 
innovation sectors), especially in service sectors (Diodato, Neffke, and O’Clery, 2018). As a 
result, leading innovative urban agglomerations today appear functionally specialized and in 
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the abstract, cognitive and conceptual tasks of R&D and innovation, with fewer co-located 
routine production tasks than in past periods (Crescenzi and Iammarino, 2017; Duranton and 
Puga, 2005).  
We showed above that the patenting activity of countries has become less specialized, 
implying that most countries engage in a wider variety of different technology classes. Looking 
at individual hotspots, more subtle differences emerge, as shown in figure 5. The figures show 
the shares of broad technology classes of filed PCT patents. Note that these do not sum up to 
100%, as patents can be filed in more than one class. The figure shows the largest hotspots over 
the 2012-2016 period. There are several, and in particular the largest hotspots, that exhibit 
growing specialization in the electricity and physics classes, such as California, the Capital 
Region of Korea, Guangdong and Washington State. Southern Kanto, Kansai, Bavaria and 
Texas are more diversified.  
 
[Figure 5 around here] 
 
As noted, Europe and the USA are a good contrast in granularity, with the USA having a 
smaller number of generally bigger innovation clusters than Europe (Crescenzi et al, 2007). 
Moreover, the landscape still contains some more traditional types of clusters in capital-
intensive sectors such as mining, mechanical engineering, petroleum, shipbuilding, and 
aerospace. These generate agglomerations that combine core engineering-production tasks 
with core innovation tasks, Texas being a good example of this. 
This shift from a larger number of sectorally specialized clusters towards a smaller number 
of specialized innovation hotspots becomes evident when looking at the overall concentration 
of patenting. Table 1 shows the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of patent concentration across 
NUTS3 regions, as well as the share of the largest region in total national patenting. For China 
and South Korea, the 1990 values should be taken with a grain of salt, as there was little 
patenting overall. It should also be note that comparability of magnitudes of these indicators 
across countries is difficult, because of the differences in size and number of regions. There 
are clear differences in trends, in particular between Europe and the US. In Europe, 
concentration is low. The HH-index is falling slightly over the period, while the share of the 
top region is increasing slightly. In the US in contrast, both the HH-index and the share of the 
top region (California) is rising significantly. The increase in concentration is even larger when 
focusing on ICT classes in the bottom panel. Looking at Germany separately, there is some 
17 
 
fluctuation over the period, but no trend, except for ICT patents, where concentration is 
increasing somewhat.  
Looking at the Asian economies, there is an uptick in concentration in Japan in the last 
period. In South Korea, regional concentration of patenting remained stable over the period, 
rising only slightly for ICT patents in the last period. In China, concentration of patenting 
locations decreases only slightly over the last two periods, despite a big push of 
industrialization from the coasts to the interior provinces (Wei, 2013). As in the US case, this 
illustrates the increasing independence of innovation from manufacturing activity.  
 
[Table 1 around here] 
 
The type of multi-sectoral but functionally specialized innovation clustering of the 3rd 
industrial revolution generates a problem with theoretical terminology used to capture urban 
productivity and innovation dynamics. In the classical terminology, we distinguish between a 
sectorally-specialized (vertical supply chain) agglomeration (Marshall) and a diversified, 
multi-sectoral (horizontal) agglomeration (Jacobs). Finally, there are “Marshall-Arrow-
Romer” agglomeration effects due to localized learning, which opens up the question of 
whether learning is more effective in sectorally specialized or diverse agglomerations, those 
with, organized hierarchy or informal interaction, or – most recently – those that are 
functionally specialized but sectorally diversified.  
In this light, many of the top innovation clusters discussed here are not neatly captured by 
the traditional concepts of specialization and diversity. In response to this gap, new ideas have 
been advanced, among which the most prominent are “related diversity” and “related variety” 
(Frenken, Van Oort and Verburg, 2007; Neffke, Henning and Boschma, 2011). They posit that 
clustering of a firm using related technologies involving many different output sectors can 
create synergies in the use of certain basic innovations to innovate into related areas or related 
varieties of outputs. From the standpoint of spatial economics, such clusters would be 
considered “specialized,” but not sectorally specialized. Balland, Boschma, Rigby, and Roesler 
(2019) use patent data to show the path dependency of technological change in US metropolitan 
areas. They establish the technological relatedness between different technology fields based 
on patent citations, and then map the specialization of MSAs over time. They find that MSAs 
that develop their specialization within related fields enjoy stronger economic growth as they 
are able to build on existing knowledge. 
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In evolutionary economic theory and theories of technological change, previous 
technological or organizational endowments have a strong role in shaping subsequent capture 
or creation of innovation (Nelson and Winter, 1982). One such argument is that more 
diversified economies have a greater probability of successful transitions than narrowly 
specialized ones. This idea, often attributed to Jane Jacobs (1961), holds that evolution is a 
probabilistic process, so that having more irons in the fire will enable more likely 
recombination into future success. Theoretical models of “nursery cities” draw on it (Duranton 
and Puga, 2001). Chinitz (1961) made a more subtle argument about the qualities of previous 
regional economic endowments. In his account, dominant industries tend to monopolize talent, 
factor supplies and attention, potentially crowding out other activities, and hence they can 
channel the evolution of regional economies down distinctive pathways. Most established 
innovation systems depend on historical industry concentrations and social linkages (Moulaert 
and Sekia, 2003).  
 
5.2. Innovative clusters as development policy 
 
Policy makers keen to spread the employment generating and productivity enhancing 
effects to lagging regions have long sought to create new clusters away from established 
innovation hotspots. Yet, there is little systematic large-scale evidence of the success of policies 
trying to create new local clusters. The last several decades are littered with failed 
“technopolis” or “the next Silicon Valley” policy initiatives (Chatterji, Glaeser and Kerr, 2011). 
Government subsidies might actually attract the wrong kind of firms that have low productivity 
and depend on subsidy for survival, or who are not in fact open to creating networks among 
local firms, for fear of leaking IP (Zhu, He, and Xia, 2018). As in the natural world, firms form 
ecosystems that are not easily transplantable or reproducible (Ascani, Crescenzi and 
Iammarino, 2012). Anchor institutions such as universities and MNEs may be important factors 
in generating innovative agglomerations, though the presence of a university in itself is not 
enough in and of itself (Arora, Cohen, and Cunningham, 2018; Faggian and McCann, 2009).  
As discussed above, innovative activity may have a natural tendency to cluster and 
concentrate. To balance the investments in research and development undertaken by 
businesses, many European governments target public innovation funding towards regions that 
receive less private investment (Forth and Jones, 2020). Nonetheless, the evidence in figure 6 
points to the growing importance of hotspots. By 2016, 35% of all global PCT filings originated 
from just 5 regions. More than 10% originated from only one region. These trends are even 
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more evident for ICT patents. The share of the top five regions increased steeply in recent 
years, to over 50% in 2016.  
 
[Figure 6 around here] 
 
But the above does not mean that all policy has failed in influencing cluster formation. In 
the USA, a notable success story – perhaps not equivalent to Boston or Silicon Valley, but still 
successful – is Research Triangle Park in North Carolina (Feldman, 2014). There are several 
cases of successful government intervention to generate clusters in technologically-emerging 
economies. For example, in 2008, the municipal government of Chongqing, China, helped to 
transplant several smaller coastal notebook computer manufacturing clusters into the city. 
Businesses were incentivized by investments in infrastructure, labor market organization, and 
other business-friendly policies. The government in Chongqing benefitted from extensive 
powers and good connections to the central government to facilitate its goals. This also 
facilitated the implementation of policies to attract inward FDI, such as reduced taxes and 
social costs and public investment in infrastructure. However, this is a cluster that was moved, 
rather than growing from scratch. The IT cluster in Bangalore, India was incubated by 
investment in India’s space program, and then grew, supported by local investment in 
infrastructure and human capital (Gao, Dunford, Norcliffe, and Liu, 2018).  
Indeed, while figure 6 above showed the impressive dominance of a few hotspots, figure 
7 shows that in terms of overall patenting growth, there is a lot of dynamism outside established 
the biggest hotspots. The graph shows the growth in patenting (the height of the graphs), split 
by the largest hotspots and world regions (the colored blocks). The upper panel shows all 
patents, while the lower panel focuses on ICT classes. The top panel shows that for total 
patenting, hotspots contribute less than half to total patenting growth, and the hotspot share has 
remained relatively stable. There has been a shift in the distribution across world regions 
though, with Asia overtaking Europe and North America in total patenting growth. For ICT 
classes, hotspots play a larger role, contributing around two-thirds to total patenting growth. 
By far the largest single contribution during the last period is from Guangdong, where total 
patenting growth outstripped that in all of North America.  
 
[Figure 7 around here] 
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6. Synthesis: The Geography of Innovation and Inequality, and a 
Research Agenda 
 
There is considerable evidence of a positive relationship between innovation productivity 
and its spatial concentration and specialization. However, a highly concentrated innovation 
sector may increase spatial development inequalities within and across countries. Jobs in 
innovation-related activities tend to pay higher wages than in other functions and the spatial 
concentration of these jobs is contributing to growing spatial and social income inequality. 
While high-skilled jobs create many low-skilled jobs in the home market (Moretti, 2012), 
inflows of high-earners combined with inelastic housing supply often result in growing 
inequality and falling disposable income for low income households. Ultimately, this leads to 
increased – whether at intra-metropolitan or inter-regional scale -- sorting by skill groups into 
innovative, high-earning areas and non-innovative, low-earnings areas, excluding the low-
skilled from the opportunities and amenities of living and working in an innovative 
environment (Diamond, 2016). Some evidence suggests that this is compensated to some extent 
by social mobility and opportunity for the less skilled who live in the more dynamic but unequal 
and segregated metropolitan areas (Chetty, Hendren, Lin and Majerovitz, 2016). We still know 
too little about the geography of positive and negative effects of these kinds of inequalities and 
how they unfold over generations.  
Concentrating innovation in a smaller number of bigger and more specialized regions at 
both national and international scales can possibly raise the overall economy-wide rate of 
innovation. But if innovation activity concentrates, then other regions may be deprived of the 
possibility of becoming innovative in the future (Feldman and Storper, 2018; Feldman, Guy, 
and Iammarino, 2019). On the other side of this, if the more innovative output of the economy 
as a whole generates innovations that can subsequently be spatially spread through absorption, 
then one uneven process may feed a spread of subsequent benefits. However, if the labour 
market effects of spatially concentrated innovation are also skill-biased and geographically 
concentrated, then a set of inequality-increasing effects would reinforce one another.  
 
6.1. Is innovation for winners only? Are current innovation agglomerations too big? 
 
The geographical concentration of innovation in global hotspots raises several related 
issues concurrent with an overall productivity growth slowdown observed in many countries, 
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especially as compared to the heyday of the second industrial revolution (Gordon, 2014 and 
2018). Moreover in the current period, which is usually seen as a highly innovative age, R&D 
productivity has been declining, reflected in an increasing unit cost of R&D outputs, when 
measured by technological performance of those outputs (Bloom, Jones, van Reenen and 
Webb, 2017). Concentration in bigger agglomerations of these less productive skilled 
innovation workers and their employers may partly compensate for the decline in productivity. 
Further evidence, though not tightly linked to the declining R&D productivity hypothesis, 
suggests that many new technology industries (especially the platform-based ones and finance) 
are oligopolistic (Feldman et al., 2019). This would allow us to square the increasing number 
and cost of innovative workers, due to declining R&D productivity, but made possible by 
oligopoly rents, part of which are passed through into wages. And the growing concentration 
and higher wage bills could be consistent with a declining labor share of wages in oligopolistic 
local economies (Benmelech, Bergman and Kim, 2019; Azar, Marinescu, Steinbaum and 
Taskar, 2017). 
The specific organizational content of contemporary innovation agglomerations has 
certain important differences to the agglomerations of the past. They involve a greater diversity 
of functional dimensions, which include R&D, universities and education, deal-making, 
financing, servicing and curating in variable organizational geometries (Diodato et al., 2018). 
These “ecosystems” are organized differently from the classical Marshallian agglomerations, 
that consisted of leading companies and their hierarchically organized partners or internal R&D 
arms. To retain economies of scale in each of these activities, innovative clusters would have 
to become bigger by implication. This would in turn reinforce the overall geographical 
concentration of innovation and the observed tendency toward inter-regional income 
divergence (O’Sullivan and Strange, 2018; Iammarino and McCann, 2018). Nonetheless, we 
lack models of the spatial “granularity” (or divisibility) of innovation, meaning the extent to 
which these related diversity agglomerations can be spread across the landscape (into a larger 
number of narrower niche agglomerations) or whether they inevitably tend toward metropolitan 
super-clusters and hence greater inter-regional inequality.  
We therefore need much more investigation of whether the current size distribution and 
population of agglomerations reflect true productivity gains or oligopoly rents and whether the 
current spatial distribution is the efficient one or whether superstar innovation agglomerations 
are, to put it simply, bloated in size. One of the most difficult questions for geography, 
economics and development studies is to identify why innovative agglomerations arise and 
flourish where they do; and yet this is understandably of greatest interest to policymakers. This 
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question takes us from the general factors that lie behind the agglomeration of innovation to 
the specific geographies of those agglomerations, or vernacularly from the “what” and “how” 
to the “where” (Chatterji et al, 2011; Storper, 2018; Storper, Kemeny, Makarem and Osman, 
2015).  
To return to our opening statement, innovation is the essential motor of the economy, but 
once we consider its geographies and the causes of those geographies, it can be seen as a 
societally-embedded change process with complex indirect effects. The geography of 
innovation is ultimately not just about spatial distributions of innovation, but must engage 
debates about market structure, efficiency, rent-seeking, competition, and income distribution 
within and between countries. 
 
 
7. Tables 
 
Table 1: Trends in regional concentration by country 
All 
 1990 2000 2016 
 
HH-
index 
Top 
share 
HH-
index 
Top 
share 
HH-
index 
Top 
share 
China 41.21 60.1% 34.65 56.8% 31.03 52.7% 
Europe (incl. 
Germany) 2.37 6.8% 2.23 7.0% 1.97 7.6% 
Germany 17.58 26.7% 16.73 24.7% 18.15 28.7% 
Japan 29.41 48.7% 29.76 47.7% 34.85 54.7% 
South Korea 65.02 79.5% 50.64 69.1% 51.55 69.8% 
United States 6.68 18.5% 7.98 23.1% 10.30 27.9% 
ICT 
 1990 2000 2016 
 
HH-
index 
Top 
share 
HH-
index 
Top 
share 
HH-
index 
Top 
share 
China 57.40 69.2% 19.20 32.0% 43.82 63.2% 
Europe (incl. 
Germany) 4.02 10.0% 3.66 11.2% 2.57 9.1% 
Germany 20.20 33.6% 24.64 44.1% 25.91 44.3% 
Japan 44.04 63.5% 39.99 59.4% 43.96 63.7% 
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South Korea 100.00 100.0% 68.11 81.9% 71.41 83.9% 
United States 10.93 24.5% 13.88 34.1% 22.77 45.3% 
Note: HH-index is measured on a scale from 0 to 1000, 1000“Top share” is the share of patents from the region 
with the highest number of patents in that year.  
 
 
8. Figures 
 
Figure 1: Global PCT filings by country 
 1980 2000 2016 
 Total filings Shares Total filings Shares Total filings Shares 
North America 1291 46.5% 43019 41.9% 56921 24.6% 
Japan 278 10.0% 10822 10.5% 44546 19.3% 
China 0 0.0% 1426 1.4% 42596 18.4% 
Rest of Europe 855 30.8% 25926 25.2% 38985 16.8% 
Germany 189 6.8% 13304 13.0% 18715 8.1% 
South Korea 0 0.0% 1962 1.9% 14892 6.4% 
Rest of world 11 0.4% 3445 3.4% 8576 3.7% 
India 0 0.0% 268 0.3% 2372 1.0% 
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Australia 147 5.3% 1753 1.7% 1936 0.8% 
Russia  
 
586 0.6% 1125 0.5% 
Brazil 7 0.3% 177 0.2% 733 0.3% 
 
 
Figure 2: Country shares for different IPC sections 
Physics Electricity 
  
 
Figure 3: Global concentration of patenting by class 
 
Figure 4: Global hotspots 
25 
 
 
Figure 5: Technology specialisation of global hotspot regions over time 
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Figure 6: Share of global patents originating from hotspot regions 
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Figure 7: Which hotspots contributed most to global patenting growth? 
All PCT patents 
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Patents in the J-tag ICT classification 
 
 
9. Appendix 
 
Figure A1: The “J-tag” taxonomy of ICT technologies 
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Source: Inaba and Squicciarini (2017), table 2.  
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